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Are Ratings the Worst Form of Credit Assessment
Apart from All the Others?
Abstract
Ending the dependence on rating agencies is a top priority for the Financial Stability Board,
which coordinates the G20 financial policies. Rating agencies have been accused of contributing
to the recent financial crisis by misjudging the creditworthiness of mortgage-backed securities.
Their downgrading practice of sovereigns and corporations is said to amplify procyclicality and
to fuel market uncertainty. However, it is one thing to criticize rating agencies, quite another to
find an appropriate alternative. For the case of corporate issuer ratings, we show that there is
at least one such alternative. From a statistical viewpoint, it outperforms credit ratings. From a
practical viewpoint, it is straightforward to implement and depends solely on publicly available
data. Therefore, we conclude that for the case of corporate credit risk, appropriate alternatives
to credit ratings do exist!
JEL Classification Codes: G01, G18, G24
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1 Introduction
The former chief economic advisor of the Obama administration once set up a parable that compared
finance theorists with “ketchup economists”:
“They have shown that two quart bottles of ketchup invariably sell for twice as much as
one quart bottles of ketchup” Summers (1985)
Ketchup economists conclude from this finding that the ketchup market is perfectly efficient. Like
parallels apply to credit ratings. Rating agencies assign characters to firms and sell the information
about these allocations. The more characters, and the earlier in the alphabet, the more likely is the
firm perceived to pay back its debt. Similar to the ketchup economists, rating agencies provide us with
relative assessments. Though investors must use ratings as an absolute indication of the likelihood of
receiving the money owed to them in accordance with the terms on which they invested. Furthermore,
agencies keep their ratings stable in times of crisis as long as the relative rank order remains balanced,
even if the firms’ default probabilities increase. Rating agencies thus do not provide us with an answer
to what seems an important question of which rating is assigned to what level of default probability.
We call this the level question. Despite the agencies’ focus on relative performance, ratings do not
provide us information about the marginal increase in default risk between the ratings. How much
more likely is a firm to fail if it is downgraded from AA to A? We call this the shape question. What
the agencies seem to provide is discriminatory power, that is, the ability to distinguish between
surviving and defaulting borrowers. With the recent crisis, critics have not been slow to note that
the agencies showed a weak performance, even regarding the discriminatory power of their rating
assignements. Yet alternatives are hard to find. Hilscher and Wilson (2012) provide a simple model
that outperforms the agencies’ ratings in terms of discriminatory power, and that better explains the
fluctuations in the credit markets. However, the two central questions whether the new contender
explains the absolute level of default risk, and whether the difference in predicted default risk between
two borrowers agrees with the real increase in default risk – questions regulators should be concerned
about – remain unanswered.
In this paper, we present a simple credit risk model that feeds only on publicly available financial
data. Our model is transparent, replicable, and easy to implement. In a carefully executed out-of-
sample analysis, we provide empirical evidence that the model we propose significantly outperforms
the default forecasts implied by credit ratings. Most importantly, our model answers the level, and
shape questions. Hence, our model may serve as an appropriate alternative to credit ratings from
both a regulatory and an econonomic perspective.
Critics blame the agencies, in addition to their poor performance, for amplifying procyclicality
and increasing overall market uncertainty. They are accused to do so not only in the case of corporate
ratings, but also in the case of sovereign debt. When S&P unprecedentedly downgraded the United
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States’ long-term debt from its triple-A rating in August 2011, it prompted a global sell-off and a
spike in market volatility not seen since December 2008. But also European countries have been on
the agencies’ radar. Since spring 2010, the rating agencies relegated Greece, Portugal, and Ireland
to “junk” status, a move that many EU officials say has accelerated a burgeoning eurozone sovereign
debt crisis. In January 2012, amid continued eurozone instability, S&P downgraded nine eurozone
countries, stripping France and Austria of their triple-A ratings. Whether these downgrades are
justified or not, fact is that in most cases the agencies’ action has led to disruptions in financial
markets and fueled investors’ fear about the vulnerability of the financial stability.
Despite the harsh criticism, credit ratings from the big three rating agencies remain the most
common and widely used measure of credit quality. Alternative approaches have been slow to emerge
and most firms and regulators continue to use their ratings. This sustained power of the big agencies
stems from their designation as government-approved rating firms.1 In 1975, the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) began choosing, which raters could be used to determine the
minimum capital requirements for financial institutions to trade certain debt securities. The three
raters initially chosen, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, were christened as “nationally recognized statistical
rating organizations” (NRSROs). Over the years, the SEC added more rating agencies to the list
of NRSROs. However, the big three rating agencies maintained their dominant positions and their
ratings have enjoyed the status of a quasi-regulatory standard and a commonly agreed principle
heavily hardwired into defining capital standards, pricing corporate bonds, investment processes,
and contract specifications of structured products.
With the recent financial crisis, however, public pressure on the rating agencies’ hegemony is
mounting. The Financial Stability Board, coordinating the G20 financial policies, has asked gov-
ernments and regulators to find ways to break the dependency on credit ratings. Both the United
States and Europe have taken steps to regulate the three main rating agencies and ensure more
transparency and competitiveness. In July 2010, the United States enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),2 which created an Office of Credit
Ratings at the Securities and Exchange Commission to hold rating agencies accountable and protect
investors and businesses. This commission has to review any regulation that makes any references
to credit ratings. In a subsequent step, the commission is supposed to remove any requirement
of reliance on credit ratings and to substitute these with an alternative approach the commission
finds appropriate. Also in Europe moves are underway to regulate the credit ratings agencies more
tightly. In early 2011, the EU established an independent authority, the European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA), tasked with regulating the activities of rating agencies relative to EU
standards. The ESMA initiative basically parallels the Dodd-Frank Act. However, for the time
being, the markets – and some of the world’s biggest economies – remain at the rating agencies’
1For an interesting historical review of how the judgments of creditworthiness by the rating agencies attained the
force of law, we refer to Partnoy (1999).
2See http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-64352.pdf.
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mercy. Indeed, it is one thing to identify the shortcomings of credit ratings, quite another to find an
appropriate alternative standard. Despite all the criticism, the question remains unanswered as to
what an appropriate alternative to credit ratings might be. Nevertheless, we might agree on some
common principles, which we briefly sketch below.
Firstly, the probability of default should be calibrated, that is, it should answer the shape and
the level questions. A calibrated model matches predicted and observed default rates across the
entire span of the data. Unfortunately, the design of an appropriate test statistic for validating the
forecasting power along these two dimensions is very subtle, as credit default data is spare and not
i.i.d. distributed. Some suggest replacing corporate and sovereign ratings with credit-default-swap
prices. However, these prices are pro-cyclical and incorporate a systematic risk premium which
induces a bias in the default forecast.3 Furthermore, two obligors with equal default probabilities
can have different credit-default-swap spreads, depending on the economic state in which they are
expected to fail, see Coval et al. (2009). Hence credit spreads do not answer the shape and the level
questions either and are thus no viable alternative to agency ratings.
Secondly, an appropriate alternative can only be one with a discriminating power at least as good
as that of credit ratings. Most importantly, alternatives must perform reasonably well in times of
market distress.
Thirdly, an appropriate alternative should be transparent, especially so if used for regulatory
purposes. The joint notice issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency requires
that a potential alternative must be sufficiently transparent, unbiased, replicable, and defined to
allow banking organizations of varying size and complexity to arrive at the same assessment of
creditworthiness for similar exposures and to allow for appropriate supervisory review.4 In contrast,
the credit ratings of S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch all are black boxes as they are all based on proprietary
models and data.5
Fourthly, we believe that credit ratings should preferably be point-in-time and not through-the-
cycle forecasts.6 To justify our statement, we refer to the ongoing debate on bank regulation. It
must be in the regulator’s interest to link regulatory capital requirements as closely as possibly to
the banks’ economic capital.7 With more transparent credit risk buffering, taking into account the
increased default risk in times of recession, credit ratings should naturally lead to a cyclical behavior
of capital requirements. Rating agencies such as S&P disregard cyclical effects. Credit ratings do
not anticipate the higher bankruptcy risk during recessions. However, a powerful default predictor
3See, e.g., Blo¨chlinger (2010).
4See Federal Register Volume 76, Number 245 (Wednesday, December 21, 2011),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-12-21/html/2011-32073.htm.
5Indeed, any rating provided by a rating company may be flawed with respect to replicability, as these companies
have to make a living out of it.
6There are different views on this subject. See, e.g., Altman and Rijken (2006).
7See, e.g., Crouhy et al. (2001).
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must anticipate the increased default risk even if the heightened default intensity is expected to be
only transitory and not permanent. The default intensity may be expected to increase temporarily
during economic downturns, but may decrease again in an economic upswing if the borrower indeed
survives this transition period. This view is also implicitly supported by the Dodd-Frank Act.8
From a stability viewpoint, we may finally argue that credit quality should be expressed as a
continuous variable. When an ordinal credit rating changes, the implied default probability changes
discontinuously. If a change in rating hits a company whose failure poses a systemic risk, this dis-
continuity may well spread over into the stock market leading to a substantial drop in the company’s
share price. Hence, discontinuous changes during difficult times may further nourish market uncer-
tainty by giving incentive for creditors to run, precipitating a collapse and contagion. A prominent
example of such an epidemic effect is the downgrade of AIG in 2008 leading to multiple collateral
calls, increased liquidity stress, and falling market confidence.
We note that the above list is by no means exhaustive. Nevertheless, it represents a list of
minimal requirements for potential candidates, which may serve as appropriate alternatives to credit
ratings. Furthermore, it allows us to position our contribution along these principles: By using the
appropriate test statistics which overcome the problem of sparseness and dependency in default data,
our out-of-sample study shows that, with a simple credit risk model, we can significantly outperform
the forecasting power of credit ratings. Since we rely only on publicly available financial data and
our credit model is straightforward to implement, we also fulfill the requirement of transparency
and replicability. With the calibration tests of Blo¨chlinger and Leippold (2011) for the default
probabilities, we ensure unbiased estimates of default probabilities. Furthermore, we provide two
versions of our model, one that generates a point-in-time forecast and that generates a through-
the-cycle default probability forecast. We find that our through-the-cycle forecast performs at least
as good as the forecast based on credit ratings. For our point-in-time forecast, we find that it
significantly outperforms the forecast based on credit ratings. Hence, we contribute to the literature
on credit risk by showing that a model does exist, which is in line with the principles outlined above
and which can be deemed an appropriate alternative to corporate credit ratings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the literature
most closely related to our work. In Section 3, we introduce the market-based and accounting-based
methodologies we use for the design of our credit risk model. In Section 4, we describe the data
underlying the calibration of our model and the out-of-sample analysis to study the forecasting ability
of different model specifications and credit ratings. In Section 5, we present our statistical analysis.
We split our analysis into an in-sample and an out-of-sample analysis. Section 6 concludes.
8See, e.g., the Amendments to Rule 15c3-1, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-64352.pdf.
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2 Related Literature
Predicting corporate failure has been a long standing problem in credit risk research. There is an
abundant literature on this topic. Therefore, we will mention only those papers that are directly
related to our work. One of the most influential and early contribution is the Altman (1968) Z-score
model that employs information from accounting ratios to form a forecast of default. The Altman’s
Z-score relies mostly on information obtained from companies’ financial statement. The Z-score
model was subsequently refined in Altman et al. (1977) to the so called Zeta-score model. We use
this model for our analysis of accounting-based default forecasts.
The basic model to forecast defaults based on market data is Merton’s (1974) bond pricing (or
distance-to-default) model. Instead of using accounting data, the main input for this model is the
value of equity and its volatility to obtain the firm’s default probability. Hence, the model does use
the market value of debt rather than the book value of debt, as accounting models do.9 For our
purpose, we implement the version of the distance-to-default model as described in Bharath and
Shumway (2008). Their focus is on exploring the performance of this model compared to simpler
alternatives. Indeed, they find that the simpler model performs slightly better than the distance-
to-default model in out-of-sample default forecasts. However, they do not compare the forecasting
performance to the performance of the agencies’ credit ratings.
Shumway (2001) develops a hazard model for default forecasting combining both accounting and
market data. He argues that well-established bankruptcy prediction models such as, e.g., the Altman
(1968) Z-score model, are not correctly specified as they do not consider all the available firm-year
observations. In contrast, a hazard model takes into account all the available observations for the
bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. Shumway (2001) shows that the inclusion of these additional ob-
servations produces efficient and consistent estimates of the coefficients. Furthermore, he documents
that using a discrete hazard model, many of the accounting ratios incorporated in accounting-based
models are not statistically significant for predicting bankruptcy. Combining both accounting ratios
and market-driven variables into a hazard model outperforms the purely accounting-based models
in out of sample forecasts. In our paper, we follow Shumway’s (2001) suggestion in that we also
construct a hybrid model based on accounting and market data.
A rich literature on the role of credit ratings has emanated in the wake of the US corporate credit
meltdown in 2001 and 2002. An early review of this literature is given in Cantor (2004). Later
literature includes, e.g., Boot et al. (2006), where they theoretically study two important functions
of credit rating agencies, the dissemination of ratings information to market participants and the
facilitation of financial regulation and contracting. In an empirical study, Becker and Milbourn (2011)
find a significantly negative link between competition and quality. Hence, calls for more competition
in the ratings industry10 may have counter-productive effects, since increasing competition may
9Vassalou and Xing (2004) use the Merton model to explore the effect of default risk on equity return.
10An increase in competition was required, e.g., by the US Department of Justice (1998).
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impair the reputational mechanism that seemingly underlies the provision of good quality ratings.11
With the recent financial crisis, a strand of literature emerged that particularly called into question
the rating practice for structured products.12
Closely related to our study is the paper by Hilscher and Wilson (2012). They find that credit
ratings are dominated as predictors of corporate default by a simple model based on publicly available
financial information. They conclude that ratings are poor measures of raw default probabilities.
Hilscher and Wilson (2012) do not apply calibration tests, that is, they do not answer the shape
and the level questions. Furthermore, they estimate their model using data up to 2003 and evaluate
their model from 2004 to 2008. Hence, the interesting period over the recent financial crises is left
out. They conclude that, for the out-of-sample period, the relative difference between their default
forecasts and the forecasts based on credit ratings is larger than for their full sample. However, they
do not provide any thorough statistical analysis of their out-of-sample forecasts. Furthermore, to test
the cumulative forecast accuracy, as opposed to the marginal forecast accuracy, Hilscher and Wilson
(2012) take accounting data as of January which, however, is not available to the rating agencies at
this point in time. Therefore, the comparison of the forecasting performance starts with giving a
strong disadvantage to the rating agencies. Finally, their definition of default is taken from the KRIS
data set and not from the S&P’s ’D’-rating. This raises the question whether these two definitions
of the default state differ. If they do, the comparison will become biased.
There is overwhelming evidence that defaults are dependent and tend to cluster. The issue of
default clustering has been studied, e.g., in Das et al. (2007), Duffie et al. (2007), Duffie et al. (2009),
and Lando and Nielson (2010). This strand of research is mainly centered around the definition
and identification of a set of significant covariates influencing the timing of defaults. For our study,
the clustering of default inevitably brings the challenge of using the appropriate test statistic. This
problem, which is further aggravated by the sparseness of default data, led the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2005) to conclude that “statistical tests alone will be insufficient to adequately
validate an internal rating system.” However, Blo¨chlinger and Leippold (2011) dispel these concerns
by developing a test statistic for event forecasting, which overcomes sparseness and dependency.
Their test statistic was subsequently extended to a multiperiod setting in Blo¨chlinger (2011). He
shows that well known discrimination figures like the Gini index or the area under the ROC curve can
differ in different states of the economy. When comparing the discriminatory power of two models,
however, the dependence on the state of economy can be filtered out. By applying the summary
statistics developed in Blo¨chlinger (2011) for multiple time periods, we can perform a thorough
statistical analysis of the different models over time.
Not only the agencies’ role in rating structured products and corporate debt has been heavily
criticized, but also the role of regulators. Already before the recent crisis, White (2007) suggests
11A possible solution to the inherent principal-agent problem for credit ratings is given, e.g., in Stolper (2009).
12See, e.g., Coval et al. (2009), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), Bolton et al. (2012), Gordy and Willemann (2012),
Mathis et al. (2009), and Skreta and Veldkamp (2009).
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a removal of the entire NRSRO structure. He furthermore levels criticism at the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for its opaque policy in establishing criteria for designating NRSROs.
Later, White (2010) warns against setting up new regulations to tame credit rating agencies, as it
would be unclear to what extent such regulation will succeed in pressing rating agencies to make
better judgments. In his conclusion, White (2010) suggests that those involved in the public debate
on rating agencies should ask the question, whether financial institutions can “instead be trusted
to seek their own sources of information about the creditworthiness of bonds, so long as financial
regulators oversee the safety of those bond portfolios.” We believe that our contribution provides
valuable guidance in answering this question.
3 Methodology
To forecast default, we consider two accounting-based models, the five components of the Z-score
model of Altman (1968) and the seven components of the Zeta-score model of Altman et al. (1977),
and we also consider a market-based model, the Merton (1974) distance-to-default model. In addi-
tion, we also introduce a model that takes advantage of the virtues of both these approaches, i.e.,
we combine accounting data with Merton’s market-based model.
3.1 The Merton Distance-to-Default Model
The Merton (1974) distance-to-default model generates a default probability for borrowers with
market-traded equity. The Merton (1974) model stipulates that the equity value of a firm satisfies:
Ei = ViΦ(di)− e
−rFiΦ(di − σi), (1)
where Ei is the market value of the ith firm’s equity, Vi is the market value of the firm’s total asset,
Fi is the face amount of the firm’s debt, r is the continuously compounded risk-free interest rate,
Φ(.) is the cumulative Gaussian distribution function, σi is the volatility of the firm’s total asset,
and di is given by:
di =
log Vi − logFi + r +
1
2
σ2i
σi
.
Under Merton (1974)’s assumptions, the equity value is a function of the asset value of the firm. By
Ito’s lemma we can show that asset volatility and equity volatility σEi are related by:
σEi =
Vi
Ei
Φ(di)σi. (2)
In implementing the distance-to-default model, we follow Bharath and Shumway (2008). The
procedure can be described in five steps. In the first step, we estimate σEi from historical stock
returns data. We use historical daily returns data over a rolling window of one year to estimate σEi .
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In the second step, we choose a measure of the face value of the firm’s debt Fi. We use the current
liabilities plus one-half of long-term debt. In the third step, we collect the equity values and risk-free
rates in the corresponding home country of the firm. The equity value Ei is calculated as the product
of share price and the number of shares outstanding. The one-year risk free rate r approximated by
the generic on-the-run government bill, note, or bond indices.13
While the first three steps give us values for each of the variables in equations (1) and (2), we still
need the total value of the firm Vi and the volatility of firm value σi. In the fourth step, we compute
Vi and σi by simultaneously solving equations (1) and (2). However, the market leverage moves up
and down far too much for equation (2) to provide reasonable estimates. To solve this problem, we
follow Bharath and Shumway (2008) by implementing an iterative procedure. First, we choose a
starting value σi = σ
E
i
Ei
Ei+Fi
and we use this value and equation (1) to infer the market value of each
corporation’s assets every day of the previous year. We then compute the implied asset return for
each day and use that time series to update our estimates for σi and the mean return µi. We iterate
on σi in this way until convergence.
14 For a small number of companies and months, the iterative
procedure does not converge within 14 iterations. As in Bharath and Shumway (2004), we drop the
nonconverging firm-months. For every company i for which the numerical solution converges, we
compute the distance-to-default DtDi as:
DtDi =
log Vi − logFi + µi −
1
2
σ2i
σi
. (3)
Finally, in the fifth step we transform the (negative) distance-to-default into a default probability
PDi for company i by the link function G(.) from R onto (0, 1):
PDi = G (−DtDi) = G
(
−
log Vi − logFi + µi −
1
2
σ2i
σi
)
. (4)
If the assumptions of Merton (1974) hold true, i.e., if log returns are Gaussian and asset values
reflect all public available information in a frictionless market, then the link function G(.) is neces-
sarily given by the standard Gaussian distribution function Φ(.). In this case, the probability pi is
calibrated and the most powerful default predictor among all σ (Vi)-measurable functions. Indeed,
Bharath and Shumway (2008) use the Gaussian distribution to convert distances-to-default into de-
fault probabilities. For our implementation of the Merton model, we use an empirical estimate of
the link function G(.).
13For each of the following currency we have interest rates available: AUD, BRL, CAD, CHF, EUR, GBP, HKD, IDR,
INR, JPY, KRW, MXN, MYR, NOK, NZD, SEK, SGD, THB, USD. For the remaining currencies we use the interest
rates in brackets: ARS (USD), CLP (USD), CZK (EUR), DKK (EUR), INR (USD), KWD (USD), TRY (EUR), TWD
(JPY).
14We iterate until the absolute difference in adjacent σi’s is less than 0.001.
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3.2 Augmenting the credit-scoring models
In the appendix, we briefly review the Z-score of Altman (1968) and the Zeta-model of Altman et al.
(1977) and we provide a closer description of the variables used in our calculations. The Z-score
uses five balance-sheet ratios: The ratio of working capital to total assets Z1, the ratio of retained
earnings to total assets Z2, the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets Z3, the
ratio of market value of equity/book value of total debt Z4, and the ratio of sales to total assets Z5.
The Zeta-score model contains seven variables: Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets
ζ1, stability of earnings ζ2, debt service ζ3, cumulative profitability ζ4, liquidity ζ5, capitalization ζ6,
and company size ζ7.
To improve the predictive power of our replicate of Bharath and Shumway’s (2004) Merton model,
we augment the model by the seven components of the Zeta-model as predictor variables. As our
empirical tests show, the Z-score model of Altman (1968) is dominated by the Zeta-model (see Table
4). Therefore, we only consider the latter model for our extension and we leave aside the Z-model
altogether.
For the augmented model, we use a Gaussian link function Φ(.) In addition, we apply rank and
power transformations to map the distance-to-default into a default probability.15 In particular, the
generic version of the augmented model has the form
PDi = G(DtDi) = Φ(α+ βR(DtDi) + γR(DtDi)
p + δ
7∑
j=1
ηjR(ζij)
q), (5)
where R(DtDi) is the rank transformed distance-to-default variable. The power parameters p and q
will be fixed, whereas α, β, γ, δ, and ηj , j = 1, . . . , 7, are parameters to be estimated. The variables
ζij are the Zeta variables of company i. When we adjust our default probability estimates for the
business cycle, we make the parameter α time dependent, i.e., we replace in equation (5) the variable
α by some αt.
4 Data Set
Our data set includes all S&P-rated non-financial corporations between 1982 and October 2011, for
which we collect equity and debt data from Bloomberg. All empirical results presented refer to
ratings by S&P. However, we are not aware of any reason why the conclusions we draw from our
empirical analysis for S&P ratings should not apply for ratings by Moody’s and Fitch. Therefore,
our discussions and findings can be generalized to the ratings of Moody’s and Fitch.
15Ranking transformations are often used to transform data that do not meet the assumptions of normality. E.g.,
one method replaces each original data value by its rank. This procedure has been recommended as being robust to
non-normal errors, resistant to outliers, and highly efficient for many distributions. See, e.g., Conover and Iman (1981).
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A firm is default if it is downgraded to D by S&P within a year. At the end of each month, we
observe for each firm the predictor variables and the S&P rating. Our objective is to predict whether
the firm defaults within one year. The distance-to-default is a market-based measure and changes
every day. In contrast, most of the variables of the Z-score and Zeta-score are based on balance
sheet data, which are available at most quarterly. For balance sheet data, we use the latest available
report. We do not assume that the reporting data is available immediately at the reporting date,
but with a time lag. We therefore restrict the data set on the data available in October for every
year and firm. Hence, our analysis is truly out-of-sample. We summarize the data set used for our
empirical study in Table 1.
[TABLE 1 about here]
We divide our data into an estimation sample and a validation sample. The estimation sample
ranges from 1982 to 1999 and serves to estimate the parameters of the default forecasting models.
The validation sample ranges from 2000 to 2011 and allows us to test the performance of the different
default forecasting models and to benchmark them against the agencies’ credit ratings. Our S&P
rating data ends in October 2011, hence the last date for which we can analyze whether a given
company defaults within one year is October 2010. To obtain correct statistics, we look at a single
month for every company and year, i.e., we include the S&P rating, accounting data, and distance-to-
default by the end of October for every company and year. In total, the estimation sample contains
7,684 firm-months, the validation sample contains 16,727 firm-months, for which we are able to
compute the distance-to-default.
Moody’s KMV entertains some version of the Merton (1974) distance-to-default model. Fink
(2003) contains a table with Moody’s default probabilities and volatilities for 95 companies as of
August 2000. As a sanity check, Bharath and Shumway (2008) compare estimated volatilities and
default probabilities of 80 companies with these numbers. The rank correlation between their esti-
mates and Moody’s is 80% for the default probabilities and 57% for the volatilities, respectively.
We perform the same sanity check with our data. In total, we have 78 companies for which we
can compute the rank correlation between our estimates and Moody’s. For the default probabilities,
we get a rank correlation of 83.4% and 90.3% for the volatility estimates, respectively. Table 2
summarizes these results. Hence, we can safely conclude that our method in implementing a distance-
to-default model is similar to the version of Bharath and Shumway (2008).
[TABLE 2 about here]
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5 Statistical Analysis
We split our statistical analysis into the analysis of the estimation sample and the validation sample.
The estimation sample from 1982 to 1999 is used for the in-sample estimation. The validation sample
period from 2000 to 2010 is then used for the out-of-sample analysis.
5.1 In-Sample Estimation
For our analysis, we specify different calibration functions. As a first candidate for a specification
of the calibration function, we use the original structural approach of Merton (1974) and label it by
M1. It generates the default probability PD as16
M1 : PD = Φ (−DtD) ,
where Φ(.) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard Gaussian variable, which
transforms the distance-to-default DtD into a one-year probability of default.
We also estimate a model, where the distance-to-default enters the score linearly. In particular,
we estimate the alternative calibration function labeled M2 as,
M2 : PD = Φ (α+ βDtD) = Φ (−1.57− 0.34DtD) .
In Table 3, the large t-values indicate that the constant α becomes significantly different from zero
and that the sensitivity parameter β is significantly different from one. Thus, the calibration function
M2 outperforms M1.
Since it is a well-known fact that asset returns are non-Gaussian and fat-tailed, we expect that
rank and power transformations applied to the distance-to-default variable DtD will improve the
goodness-of-fit. Therefore, we estimate a calibration function of the form
PD = Φ(α+ βR(DtD) + γR(DtD)p) ,
for different and fixed values of p, where R(DtD) denotes the rank-transformed distance-to-default
variable. Indeed, as we see from Table 3, the rank-transformed distance-to-default variable with
p = 30, i.e.,
M3 : PD = Φ
(
−4.49 + 2.64R(DtD) + 1.63R(DtD)30
)
,
has the highest likelihood value of all Merton-based model specifications. Hence, an increase in the
distance-to-default variable increases the default probability more when the distance-to-default is
already high. As we report in Table 3, the transformation of R(DtD) to the power of 30 is more
powerful than the transformations to the power of 10 (model M4) and 50 (model M5).17
16For notational convenience, we drop the index i from the subsequent formulas.
17We have also tested the model with other values for p, but we do not report the results here.
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[TABLE 3 about here ]
In Table 4, we report the results from the estimation of probit models for the Z-score and the Zeta-
score variables. As we have already mentioned, the Zeta-score model statistically outperforms the
older Z-score model. We also note that with rank transformed variables, we obtain a better fit than
by simply winsorizing the variables. Some Zeta variables are statistically insignificant. Therefore, we
exclude these variables form the subsequent analysis and we only use debt service (ζ3), cumulative
profitability (ζ4), capitalization (ζ6), and company size (ζ7).
[TABLE 4 about here ]
To limit the influence of outliers, we apply a rank transformation to the original financial ratios.
Furthermore, we find that an additional square-root transformation allows for a better fit of the
data. Figure 1 illustrates the transformations of the four Zeta variables used in our model. As an
example, in Panel B we plot the transformation for the Zeta variable ‘cumulative probability’. If a
corporation has no retained earnings then the twice transformed cumulative profitability variable is
48.3%, compared to the rank transformed cumulative profitability variable with value 22.4%. These
values are then used for the assessment of the default probability. In particular, we observe that the
following specification of the Zeta-score model Z1 provides the best fit for the estimation period:
Z1 : PD = Φ
(
−0.02− 0.61
√
R(ζ3)− 0.95
√
R(ζ4)− 1.84
√
R(ζ6)− 0.93
√
R(ζ7)
)
= Φ(ζ) ,
where ζ is the aggregated Zeta-score and R(ζ3), R(ζ4), R(ζ6), and R(ζ7) are the rank transformed
debt service ratio, cumulative profitability, market capitalization, and company size, respectively. We
find that an additional power transformation to the aggregated Zeta-score ζ does not significantly
change the log-likelihood value. Thus, the aggregated Zeta-score enters our model without additional
transformation. The comparison of the likelihood ratios in Table 3 shows a significant statistical
superiority of our model compared to both the Altman’s Zeta-score and Merton’s distance-to-default,
while Merton’s distance-to-default models outperforms Altman’s Zeta-score.
As it has already been recognized by Shumway (2001), the combination of accounting-based
and market-based data might enhance the predictive power of a company’s default event, if both the
accounting variables and the market-based data convey company-specific credit risk information that
is not subsumed by each other. From Figure 2, we observe that the Zeta-score and the distance-to-
default are positively correlated, but not perfectly so. Spearman’s rank correlation shows a coefficient
of 61.3% in the estimation sample (Panel A) and 53.9% in the validation sample (Panel B). As
expected, the majority of defaulters is concentrated in the tenth deciles both in the estimation
sample and out of the estimation sample. Hence, as correlation is not perfect, there is hope for
improvement when both variables are combined into an augmented default risk measure. Therefore,
we implement different combinations of market-based and accounting variables, all nested as special
cases of the generic model in equation (5). We use the following model specification, which we call
12
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Figure 1: Rank and Square Root Transformation
To limit the influence of outliers, we apply a rank transformation to the original financial ratios. To obtain a
better fit of the data, we further apply a square root transformation to the rank transform of the four Zeta
variables used in our model. The four transformation functions are estimated on the estimation sample and
then applied on the validation sample.
the MZ1 calibration function:
MZ1 : PD = Φ
(
−3.61 + 2.20R(DtD) + 1.40R(DtD)30 + 0.22ζ
)
. (6)
With the specification in equation (6), we obtain a likelihood value significantly higher than the
stand-alone distance-to-default model and Zeta-score, respectively. Furthermore, as the t-value for
the Zeta-score suggest, the information content of the Zeta-score improves the overall goodness-of-fit.
In addition, we also use a business-cycle adjusted default probability, which we define as
MZ2 : PD = Φ
(
αt − 3.61 + 2.20R(DtD) + 1.40R(DtD)
30 + 0.22ζ
)
. (7)
The coefficient αt is chosen at each point in time t so that the population has the same default
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Figure 2: Joint Distribution Zeta-Score and Distance-to-Default
The Zeta-score and the distance-to-default are correlated. Spearman’s rank correlation shows a coefficient of
67.6% in the estimation sample and 57.8% in the validation sample. We plot the estimation sample in Panel
A and the validation sample in Panel B.
probability. Hence, the default probability in equation (7) corrects the default probability obtained
in equation (6) for potential business-cycle effects. By filtering out these effects, we obtain a through-
the-cycle forecast of default probabilities. By construction, the mean of the adjusted default prob-
ability is constant over time. In contrast, the default probability as defined in (6) would become
higher in a recession and lower in a boom.
Finally, for our out-of-sample study, we require the default probability implied by the S&P rating
classes. For their estimation, we use simple count statistics, i.e., we divide the number of defaulters
by the number of observations per class during the estimation sample. To have strictly positive
values for the default probabilities and to have a strictly monotone calibration function, we assign
an estimate by interpolation to the highest rating classes.
[TABLE 5 about here ]
For clarification, we illustrate the construction of the default probabilities in Table 5. These are
calculated for the first quarter of each year. The first column in Table 5 lists the different companies.
The variable ‘Def’ indicates whether the company is in default state, which is the case when ‘Def’
equals one. In the subsequent columns, we list the values of the four Zeta variables and the value
of the aggregated Zeta variable (ζ), followed by the distance-to-default variable (DtD) and its rank
transform. We include the S&P rating and list in the following column the default probabilities
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implied by the agency’s rating. We then list the resulting default probabilities from our Zeta-score
model Z1, the rank and power transformed Merton modelM3, the hybrid point-in-time modelMZ1,
and the hybrid through-the-cycle forecast MZ2.
To further illustrate the construction of default probabilities, we plot the calibration functions we
use for our out-of-sample validation in Figure 3. Basically, we have to map the rating scores from the
S&P rating, the distance-to-default, and the Zeta-score into a default probability. For the S&P-rating
we obtain this mapping by using simple count statistics, see Panel C in Figure 3. For the models
Z1, M3, and MZ1, we apply power and rank transformations to the scores before calibrating the
corresponding function to default data. The model Z1 uses a rank and power transformed Zeta-score
as input. Model M3 uses two variables as input, a rank and power transformed distance-to-default
and a rank transformed distance-to-default, respectively. We plot the transformed scores and the
resulting default probabilities as a function of the score, for model Z1 in Panel A and in Panel B for
model M3. Model MZ1 takes transformations of both the Zeta-score and the distance-to-default.
Panel D shows the default probabilities of model MZ1 as a function of the distance-to-default, given
that the included Zeta-score is excellent (first percentile), moderate (the median Zeta-score), or
disastrous (the Zeta-score is at the 99th percentile).
5.2 Out-of-Sample Validation
Before we discuss the aggregated results to evaluate the forecasting performance of the different
models, we take a look at some specific companies to get some intuition about the model-implied
default probabilities.
Figure 4 shows the time-series of one-year default forecasts for four defaulted companies, namely
of Enron, Parmalat, Delphi, and General Motors. The performance of S&P is mixed at best. They
were usually slow in down-grading a subsequent defaulter. Our observation is consistent with several
surveys which show that market participants believe that rating agencies are slow in responding
to changes in credit quality.18 The agencies usually reply to this critique that their ratings are
“through-the-cycle” with the intention of measuring credit quality over long investment horizons.
Rating stability, however, is often in conflict with rating timeliness. In the end, the default prediction
performance should guide us for finding the optimal balance between these two criteria.
From Figure 4, we observe that, in contrast to the S&P credit ratings, our default probability
anticipated much faster the imminent defaults of Enron, Parmalat, Delphi, and General Motors. For
Enron, S&P did not change the rating until days before the corporation declared bankruptcy (Panel
A). However, one of the reasons why for Enron the default probability based on the Merton model
M3 has increased may be due to a falling business cycle and a corresponding general increase of
default likelihoods. Since S&P is by their own definition through-the-cycle, one may expect that it
18See, e.g., Association for Financial Professionals (2002)
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Figure 3: Calibration Functions
For the models Z1,M3, andMZ1, we apply transformations to the scores before calibrating the corresponding
function (the mapping) to default data. The model Z1 uses a rank and power transformed Zeta-score as input
(Panel A). Model M3 uses a rank and power transformed distance-to-default and a rank transformed distance-
to-default (Panel B). Model MZ1 takes transformations of both the Zeta-score and the distance-to-default
as input (Panel D). Panel C shows the implied default probabilities of S&P credit ratings obtained by simple
count statistics.
does not anticipate the economic downturn, but it must anticipate the relative worsening of Enron’s
individual credit standing in comparison to other companies. However, even our through-the-cycle
model MZ2 picks up the worsening of Enron’s creditworthiness already at the end of 2000. For
Parmalat, the story is similar (Panel B). Parmalat defaulted in December 2003 and was the biggest
European default at that time, but the S&P rating for Parmalat at the end of November 2003
was still unchanged. The S&P record for the defaulted car parts supplier Delphi is a bit more
favorable (Panel C). However, the Zeta-score Z1 shows the best performance there. The Zeta-score
Z1 correctly generated low probabilities of default before the end of 2004 and then increased the
default risk significantly during the last year of Delphi’s life. Compared to the Merton model M3,
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Figure 4: Defaulted Companies
The figure shows the one-year-ahead default probability forecasts for defaulted companies, namely of Enron,
Parmalat, Delphi, and General Motors. The estimation sample period used for calibrating the models ranges
from 1982 to 1999. The forecasts starting from 2000 are all out-of-sample estimation.
the Zeta-score Z1 did not produce false default signals during the performing years of Delphi. For
General Motors (Panel D), the S&P ratings have correctly anticipated financial distress for the
company. This is reflected by the fact that they have gradually decreased their rating until General
Motors’ default. However, also our alternative models seem to perform well in the case of General
Motors.
While the focus in Figure 4 is on companies that actually defaulted, we may now want to switch
focus on companies that have not defaulted. In Figure 5, we plot the default probability forecasts
for Fiat, General Electric, Coca-Cola, and Mc Donald’s. We observe that the Merton model M3
may produce more false alarms than the other forecasting approaches. Especially for the three
companies General Electric, Coca-Cola and Mc Donald’s, S&P ratings and our adjusted default
probability based on MZ2 do not react to changes in the business cycle as highlighted in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Non-Defaulted Companies
The figure shows the one-year-ahead default probability forecasts for non-defaulted companies, namely of Fiat,
General Electric, Coca-Cola, and Mc Donald’s. The estimation sample period used for calibrating the models
ranges from 1982 to 1999. The forecasts starting from 2000 are all out-of-sample estimation.
In recessionary periods, the probability of default based on models M3, Z1, and MZ1 is higher on
average as during expansionary periods of the business cycle. Merton’s model M3 produces stronger
false-alarm signals in the case of General Electric (Panel B) and Mc Donald’s (Panel D), relative to
our default forecasts MZ2. The default probability based on M3 created some spikes even though
the two companies never defaulted on their debt. We observe also two spikes in the time-series of
Merton’s default probability M3 for Coca-Cola (Panel C). The S&P rating of Coca-Cola, however,
remained constant. On the other hand, S&P was rather slow in adjusting the rating of Fiat (Panel
A). With Fiat the track record of S&P is rather dismal. In 2007 the default probability based on
MZ2 for Fiat was at a historical low. Merton’s M3 default probability implied almost no default
risk. S&P followed with some delay in 2008, but it is during that time that the credit outlook of Fiat
deteriorated significantly due to the financial market crisis and the anticipated recessionary period.
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As a consequence, S&P reversed its erstwhile credit upgrade at the beginning of 2009, i.e., exactly
at a time when the credit outlook of Fiat improved again.
To test the overall performance of the various forecasting approaches, we have to look at all
companies in the validation sample simultaneously. We may have a first glimpse at the performance
of the different models when we look at Table 6. We can assess the discriminatory power of the
different models as follows. We order the companies according to their default probabilities and
analyze the number of defaults included in a given fraction of the population. For instance, we see
that among the first nine decile of S&P ratings, still 25.54% of all defaults are included. While for
the augmented model MZ1, only 13.39% are included. Hence, approximately seven eighths of all
defaulters are found in the decile with the worst credit ratings. Even if, for fairness, we look at the
through-the-cycle version of our model (MZ2), we find that 16.54% of all defaulters are included
in the first nine deciles. Therefore, we can conclude that the difference between the S&P ratings
and MZ1 indicates a superior discriminatory power of the latter model. The superiority even holds
under the adjustment of business cycle effects.
[TABLE 6 about here ]
We can collect the information from the above discriminatory analysis using the Lorenz curve.
The Lorenz curve is a graphical tool to illustrate the discrimination ability of probability forecasts.
We plot in Figure 6 the Lorenz curves of the different models. The area above the Lorenz curve serves
as summary statistic of the models’ discriminatory power. For the validation period, our probability
forecasts with the MZ1 model generate an area above the Lorenz curve of 94.50%, compared with an
area of 92.49% for Altman’s Zeta-score Z1, 93.77% for Merton’s default probability M3, and 91.84%
for the S&P credit ratings. Even when we adjust our forecasts Z2 with respect to the business cycle,
we still have a higher area above the Lorenz curve than we would obtain with S&P’s credit ratings,
i.e., 93.09% versus 91.7%. Thus, the out-performance of our simple credit scoring model MZ1 is
not purely based on the fact that the default probabilities increase (decrease) on average during
recessionary (expansionary) periods.
However, to make a precise statement about the potential out-performance of the model MZ1
with respect to the other models, we require a sound statistical test. In particular, we have two major
validation aspects that we need to assess, i.e., discrimination and calibration. Models that distinguish
well between borrowers who default and those who survive are said to have good discrimination. In
contrast, calibration refers to the model’s ability to match predicted and observed default rates. A
model where the number of observed defaults align well with the model-implied number of defaults
demonstrates good calibration. Blo¨chlinger and Leippold (2011) have recently developed a one-
period test statistic under dependent observations which proved to be more powerful than existing
tests, particularly when data is spare and clustered. These features are typical for default data.
The test statistic in Blo¨chlinger and Leippold (2011) has been extended by Blo¨chlinger (2011) to
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a multiperiod setting test statistic for calibration and discrimination power. Defaults are typically
dependent, therefore the test statistics require assumptions on the default correlations. The tests
assume that default correlations are driven by a factor. Conditional on this factor, defaults are
independent and Bernoulli distributed. The factor is assumed to have a Beta distribution. Now,
dependency is completely specified with two parameters, the factor loading ω, and the factor volatility
σ. We choose ω = 0.8, and σ = 0.7889. For details regarding the choice of these parameters, and
technical details of the tests, we refer to Blo¨chlinger (2011).
[TABLE 7 about here ]
Table 7 and Table 8 report the discriminatory power and the calibration tests. For the discrim-
inatory power, we report in Table 7 the area above the Lorenz curve for the probability forecasts
based on MZ1, the Altman’s Zeta-score Z1, Merton’s adjusted distance-to-default model M3, S&P
ratings, and our business cycle adjusted model MZ2. In addition, we report the t-values for the
hypothesis that the areas above the curve are different. We also include what we call the naive
forecast, which assumes that all companies share the same probability of default. Hence, the naive
forecast implies no discriminatory power at all. As expected, we see that all model-based approaches
differ significantly from the naive forecast. We also observe that the forecast of our model MZ1 is
significantly superior to all other forecasts at the 1% significance level. Hence, the null hypothesis of
the same discriminatory power must be rejected. For the business cycle adjusted version of MZ1,
however, we cannot statistically prove its superiority compared to the S&P ratings at a reasonable
confidence level. Therefore, our intermediate conclusion is that our through-the-cycle rating MZ2
is at least as good as the S&P ratings, with the advantage that they are based on publicly available
data only and the model is fully transparent and replicable.
So far, we have only looked at the discriminatory power of the default forecasts and we left
aside the question of whether the forecasts are calibrated. Calibration means that the forecasts are
unbiased. In Table 8 we report the relevant test statistics, i.e., the level, the shape, and the combined
statistic. The level statistic compares the realized default rate with the predicted rate. The shape
statistic depends on the difference between the realized and the expected area above the Lorenz curve.
Both normalized statistics are χ2-distributed with one degree of freedom. The combined statistic is
a summary statistic on level and shape and follows a χ2-distribution with two degrees of freedom.
We see in Panel A of Table 8 that in each year our model MZ1 provides calibrated forecast. S&P
ratings in Panel B of Table 8, however, produce non-calibrated and hence biased forecasts in three
out of eleven years (see combined p-value). We note that even with the through-the-cycle model
MZ2 we are able to generate p-values for the combined test statistic, which are all above the 5%
level.19 Hence, even our model MZ2 is calibrated. Table 8 also reports a multi-period test in the
last line of Panels A, and B respectively. The multi-period statistic is the sum of the corresponding
19These additional results can be obtained by the authors.
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Figure 6: Discriminatory Power and Shape Calibration
Our model shows the best discrimination ability to separate defaulting from non-defaulting corporations on
the validation sample from 10/2000 to 10/2010. Our approach, MZ1, is significantly more powerful than
Altman’s Zeta-score, Z1, Merton’s distance-to-default, M3, and S&P’s corporate issuer rating. Both S&P
ratings and our model demonstrate good shape calibration. The shape calibration hypotheses cannot be
rejected. The empirical Lorenz curves do not deviate significantly from the Lorenz curves that are expected if
the null hypotheses of shape calibrated forecasts are true.
independent single period statistics and thus is χ2-distributed too. The degree of freedom equals
the number of single-period statistics for the shape statistics, and level statistics respectively, and
twice this number for the combined multi-period statistic. The null hypothesis of a level and shape
calibrated rating methodology must be rejected for S&P ratings with a p-value of 0.06%, but clearly
not for our default probabilities obtained with MZ1.
[TABLE 8 about here ]
6 Conclusion
Financial legislations, some of them decades old, often require banks and corporations to rely on
credit ratings in their everyday business. Given the rating agencies’ dubious role in the financial
crisis, regulators and politicians are now aiming to wean the financial industry off its dependence on
credit rating agencies. The Dodd-Frank act mandates that all financial agencies scan their regulations
for references to credit ratings, and then remove and replace them with an appropriate alternative.
In search for such an appropriate alternative for the case of corporate credit ratings, we use a
combination of quantifiable credit concepts, namely Merton’s distance-to-default model and Altman’s
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Zeta variables. By following such an approach, we develop a credit risk model which is, unlike credit
ratings, not a black box, but transparent, replicable, and easy to implement.
For our out-of-sample analysis, we calibrate default probability forecasts using the Standard &
Poor’s corporate data base covering the period from October 1982 to October 1999. We then use
the calibrated models to perform out-of-sample forecasts for the subsequent period, starting October
2000 and ending October 2011. We show that a combination of publicly available accounting and
market data is significantly more powerful than the stand-alone concepts and significantly more
powerful than the credit ratings from S&P. In addition, compared to credit ratings we not only
provide an ordinal measure of default risk but a calibrated probability of default, i.e., our probability
forecasts are unbiased.
Since rating agencies claim to provide a through-the-cycle assessment, the default frequency per
rating class fluctuates over the business cycle. We therefore adjust our model to provide a through-
the-cycle estimate. With respect to the discriminatory power, our through-the-cycle estimates are
at least as good as the estimates implied by the credit ratings. However, while we find that the
credit ratings are biased, we can confirm unbiasedness for our estimates. Thus, our findings can
be summarized as follows: For the case of corporate credit risk, appropriate alternatives to credit
ratings do exist!
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Appendix
Variables of the Z-Score Model
Z1 compares liquid assets to total assets. The ratio is computed as working capital (current assets
minus current liabilities) over total assets.
Z2 quantifies cumulative profitability over time as the ratio of retained earnings over total assets.
Z3 illustrates the productivity of the firm’s assets, abstracting from leverage and taxes. The ratio
is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets. We compute EBIT
by summing up EBIT for the most recent four quarters. EBIT is after amortization of goodwill.
Z4 is a measure for leverage, and the only ratio of the Z-score which contains market prices. The
ratio is defined as the market value of equity over the book value of total debt. We compute the
market value of equity by multiplying the number of shares with the closing price of the share.
The number of shares is the number of primary common shares of all classes outstanding, net
of treasury shares.
Z5 quantifies the sales generating ability of the firm as the ratio of sales over total assets. We
consider the trailing twelve-month sales, i.e., the sum of the quarterly sales of the most recent
four quarters.
Variables of the ZETA Model
The ZETA model contains the following seven variables:
ζ1 corresponds to the ratio Z3 of the older Z-score model, EBIT over total assets. However, in the
original ZETA model Altman et al. (1977) include total tangible assets as the denominator.
Since many companies in our sample do not disclose intangibles, we use total assets instead.
ζ2 quantifies the stability of earnings. Altman et al. (1977) describe this measure as a normalized
measure of the standard error of estimate around a ten-year trend in ζ1. We compute this
variable as the coefficient of determination (R-squared) with the trailing twelve-month EBIT
as the dependent variable, and time as the independent variable. If EBIT follows a trend, this
variable is close to one, whereas it is close to zero if the time series of EBIT cannot be well
explained with a trend line. We choose a five-year trend. We compute R-squared as soon as
three values for ζ1 are available (this is usually the sixth reporting quarter).
ζ3 measures the ability of the firm to meet its liabilities. This variable is computed as EBIT
divided by total interest payments, plus working capital divided by long term debt. Total
interest payments are computed as the trailing twelve-month payments, i.e. the cumulated
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interest payments of the latest four quarters. Long term debt is total liabilities minus current
liabilities.
ζ4 is Z2 of the Z-score, cumulative profitability, computed as retained earnings divided by total
assets.
ζ5 measures liquidity by the current ratio, which is current assets divided by current liabilities.
ζ6 is common equity divided by total capital. In the numerator of this ratio the common equity
is measured by market value of the total equity, rather than book value.
ζ7 measures size by total assets. This is the only variable in the Z-score and the ZETA model
which has a unit. We measure total assets in million U.S. dollars.
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Table 1: Data Summary
Industry Firms Obs. Def. Obs.
1982-1999 2000-2010 1982-1999 2000-2010 1982-1999 2000-2010
Aerospace/Automotive/Capital Goods/Metal 258 425 1,297 2,982 9 51
Consumer/Service Sector 298 446 1,624 2,983 28 45
Energy and Natural Resources 139 245 614 1,511 8 12
Forest & Building Products/Homebuilders 105 137 553 952 9 21
Health Care/Chemicals 171 280 880 1,858 8 14
High Tech/Computers/Office Equipment 135 221 686 1,273 8 9
Leisure Time/Media 185 232 738 1,517 13 29
Real Estate 8 37 14 217 0 1
Telecommunications 78 166 264 860 4 45
Transportation 69 124 341 803 6 20
Utility 135 236 673 1,771 0 7
Total 1,581 2,549 7,684 16,727 93 254
We divide our data into an estimation sample covering the period from 1982 to 1999, and a validation sample with data from 2000
to 2010. Our S&P rating data ends in October 2011, hence the last date for which we can analyze whether a given company defaults
within one year is October 2010. The estimation sample contains 1,581 firms, the validation sample 2,549 firms. There are 347 firms
that defaulted (def.obs.), 93 are in the estimation sample, 254 in the validation sample. We have 24,411 firm-month observations
(obs.) in total.
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Table 2: Data Quality Check
Bharath and Shumway (2008) Our results
Rank correlation of DtD 79% 83.4%
Rank correlation of volatility 57% 90.3%
Companies with data 80 78
The table reports the rank correlation between our estimates of the asset return volatility and the
estimates published by Fink (2003). Likewise for the distance-to-default variable (DtD). We also
display the corresponding rank correlations reported by Bharath and Shumway (2008). Note that
we have two companies less in our sample.
Table 3: In-Sample Calibration
Model: M2 M4 M5 M3 Z1 MZ1
PD PD PD PD PD PD
α -1.57 -3.66 -4.96 -4.49 -3.61
(-29.54) (-10.73) (-10.99) (-10.79) (-6.37)
β -0.34
(-13.46)
γ with p = 1 1.06 3.33 2.64 2.20
(2.16) (6.25) (5.17) (4.09)
γ with p = 10 2.04
(7.79)
γ with p = 30 1.63 1.40
(7.36) (5.66)
γ with p = 50 1.56
(6.80)
zeta-score 1.00 0.22
(40.12) (2.11)
Log likelihood value -330.31 -321.70 -324.65 -321.32 -363.48 -319.06
The table reports the result from different probit regression models to transform the two ordinal credit
risk measures distance-to-default and Zeta-score into a 1-year default probability. The estimates are
derived from our estimation sample covering the S&P corporate data base for the period from 1982
to October 1999. The comparison of the likelihood ratios shows a significant statistical superiority
of our model compared to both the Altman’s Zeta-score and Merton’s distance-to-default, while
Merton’s distance-to-default models outperform Altman’s Zeta-score.
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Table 4: In-sample Estimation of Z-Score and Zeta-Score
Z-score Z-score zeta-score zeta-score zeta-score Zeta-score
(rank tr.) (rank tr.) (rank tr.) (twice tr.)
Constant -2.00 -1.02 2.69 -0.62 -0.81 -0.02
(-21.48) (-8.05) (3.22) (-4.12) (-8.09) (-0.14)
Z1: WorkCap/Assets -0.49 -0.29
(-1.76) (-1.68)
Z2, ζ4: Retain. Earn./Assets -0.76 -1.08 -3.33 -0.90 -0.75 -0.95
(-5.32) (-4.43) (-4.35) (-3.27) (-2.75) (-3.48)
Z3, ζ1: EBIT/Assets -4.72 -1.30 0.25 0.34
(-6.86) (-5.30) (1.81) (2.10)
Z4: Market Cap./Liab. -0.14 -1.81
(-2.98) (-6.52)
Z5: Sales/Assets 0.16 0.45
(2.54) (2.72)
ζ2: Earn. Stability 0.00 -0.01
(0.47) (-0.04)
ζ3: Debt Service -0.53 -0.80 -0.88 -0.61
(-3.23) (-3.11) (-3.50) (-2.41)
ζ5: Current Ratio -0.14 -0.55
(-2.91) (-3.27)
ζ6: Capitalization -0.55 -1.64 -1.62 -1.84
(-5.04) (-6.33) (-6.53) (-8.26)
ζ7: Size -0.21 -1.29 -1.15 -0.93
(-5.17) (-5.97) (-5.44) (-4.38)
Log likelihood value -407.63 -376.85 -377.82 -362.20 -375.31 -363.48
We estimate several probit regression models. To limit the influence of outliers, we first winsorize the
data at the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles to estimate the Z-score and the Zeta-score. However, based
on the likelihood value the rank transformation is significantly more suitable. When the financial
ratios are additionally square root transformed, we obtain even better fitting models. Following the
Akaike information criterion, we choose a reduced form of the original Zeta model with rank and
square root transformed financial ratios, i.e., twice transformed financial variables according to the
last column. The corresponding t-values are in brackets.
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Table 5: Calculation of Default Probabilities
Name Date Def. R(ζ3) R(ζ4) R(ζ6) R(ζ7) ζ DtD R(DtD) S&P S&P PD Z1 PD M3 PD MZ1 PD MZ2 PD
Parmalat 4/2001 0 0.310 0.388 0.117 0.877 -2.434 4.440 0.562 BBB- 0.056% 0.747% 0.134% 0.176% 0.070%
Parmalat 4/2002 0 0.333 0.414 0.180 0.875 -2.614 5.701 0.417 BBB- 0.056% 0.447% 0.036% 0.053% 0.036%
Parmalat 4/2003 1 0.328 0.342 0.065 0.891 -2.271 1.190 0.882 BBB- 0.056% 1.158% 1.696% 1.590% 0.861%
Delphi 4/2001 0 0.681 0.298 0.610 0.947 -3.483 1.892 0.827 BBB 0.050% 0.025% 1.079% 0.519% 0.225%
Delphi 4/2002 0 0.341 0.210 0.698 0.947 -3.302 4.369 0.570 BBB 0.050% 0.048% 0.143% 0.099% 0.068%
Delphi 4/2003 0 0.628 0.171 0.554 0.948 -3.305 0.811 0.906 BBB 0.050% 0.048% 2.210% 1.119% 0.588%
Delphi 4/2004 0 0.243 0.171 0.565 0.955 -3.038 5.364 0.459 BBB- 0.056% 0.119% 0.053% 0.052% 0.611%
Delphi 4/2005 1 0.227 0.059 0.001 0.939 -1.594 -2.028 0.990 BB 0.564% 5.542% 25.287% 22.459% 39.155%
GM 4/2004 0 0.243 0.269 0.017 1.000 -1.976 2.937 0.727 BBB 0.050% 2.410% 0.514% 0.708% 4.638%
GM 4/2005 0 0.078 0.264 0.009 1.000 -1.707 -1.828 0.988 BBB- 0.056% 4.395% 23.408% 20.246% 36.265%
GM 4/2006 0 0.025 0.222 0.009 1.000 -1.563 -1.848 0.988 B 6.538% 5.904% 23.408% 21.153% 52.858%
GM 4/2007 0 0.041 0.134 0.169 0.996 -2.126 3.363 0.682 B 6.538% 1.674% 0.360% 0.484% 3.344%
GM 4/2008 0 0.035 0.059 0.899 0.995 -3.026 1.220 0.880 B 6.538% 0.124% 1.665% 1.016% 1.183%
GM 4/2009 1 0.010 0.015 0.002 0.992 -1.212 -2.342 0.992 CC 50.000% 11.283% 28.600% 27.886% 12.974%
GE 4/2006 0 0.896 0.469 0.360 1.000 -3.375 7.906 0.204 AAA 0.001% 0.037% 0.020% 0.020% 0.118%
GE 4/2007 0 0.579 0.474 0.322 1.000 -3.141 11.061 0.061 AAA 0.001% 0.084% 0.020% 0.020% 0.031%
GE 4/2007 0 0.579 0.474 0.322 1.000 -3.141 11.061 0.061 AAA 0.001% 0.084% 0.020% 0.020% 0.031%
GE 4/2008 0 0.843 0.437 0.212 1.000 -3.076 4.957 0.504 AAA 0.001% 0.105% 0.080% 0.072% 0.087%
GE 4/2009 0 0.771 0.378 0.064 1.000 -2.629 -0.530 0.967 AA+ 0.010% 0.428% 9.045% 5.932% 1.778%
Insilco 4/2001 1 0.129 0.035 0.046 0.186 -1.271 -0.837 0.976 B+ 3.307% 10.179% 12.835% 13.872% 8.639%
In our estimation sample, a borrower rated BBB- has a mean yearly default rate of 0.56%, BBB has a default rate of 0.50%. We apply these
averages to obtain the S&P default probabilities applied to the validation sample. The other default probabilities are calculated according to the
different model specifications. Z1 is the Zeta-score model, M3 is Merton’s distance-to-default model with rank and power transformed variables,
and MZ1 and MZ2 are the two models combining the market-based Merton model with the accounting-based Zeta-score model. MZ1 is a
point-in-time forecast and MZ2 is a through-the-cycle forecast, i.e., this default probability forecast is business cycle adjusted.
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Table 6: Discriminatory Power
Fraction of population Fraction of defaulters included
included Z1 M3 S&P MZ1 MZ2
25.00% 0.28% 0.51% 0.04% 0.50% 1.18%
50.00% 1.97% 1.57% 1.85% 0.79% 2.36%
75.00% 9.45% 5.51% 8.31% 4.33% 5.91%
80.00% 10.24% 6.69% 10.46% 5.91% 8.27%
85.00% 13.39% 9.84% 17.04% 7.09% 11.81%
90.00% 19.28% 18.09% 25.54% 13.39% 16.54%
95.00% 31.10% 29.84% 41.15% 27.55% 28.32%
96.00% 37.79% 36.22% 47.63% 32.28% 36.61%
97.00% 49.62% 44.89% 54.33% 40.90% 44.11%
98.00% 63.03% 53.91% 61.03% 53.20% 57.15%
99.00% 78.32% 74.55% 75.18% 71.62% 79.10%
The table reports the discriminatory power of the different credit rating models. The companies are
ranked in descending order according to their credit quality. The first column reports the fraction
of the population included. For a given fraction, we count the number of defaults. We list the
corresponding numbers for the different models in the subsequent columns.
Table 7: Discriminatory Power: t-Values in Cross Tests
Area above vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs.
Lorenz curve naive Z1 M3 S&P MZ1 MZ2
Z1 92.49% 56.957 – -1.936 0.782 -3.463 -0.766
M3 93.77% 65.438 1.936 – 2.255 -6.092 1.637
S&P 91.84% 58.854 -0.782 -2.255 – -3.257 -1.311
MZ1 94.50% 72.334 3.463 6.092 3.257 – 3.243
MZ2 93.09% 53.704 0.766 -1.637 1.311 -3.243 –
In the out-of-sample statistical analysis our default forecast MZ1 approach obtains the highest area
above the Lorenz curve, i.e., our model provides the most powerful forecasts to separate defaulters
from non-defaulters. The t-values versus the naive model, Altman’s Zeta-score Z1, Merton’s distance-
to-defaultM3, and versus our through-the-cycle approachMZ2 are all greater than 2.576, i.e., highly
significant at the 1% significance level. All approaches demonstrate discriminatory power, i.e., they
are all highly significantly more powerful than naive forecasts. S&P ratings are not able to outperform
Altman’s Zeta-score.
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Table 8: Calibration Testing of One-Year Default probabilities
Panel A: MZ1 PD
time obs. def. exp. real. exp. real. level shape comb. level shape comb.
period PD PD area area p-value p-value p-value
10/2000 – 10/2001 1,213 45 2.29% 3.71% 0.909 0.914 1.105 0.075 1.180 0.2931 0.7842 0.5542
10/2001 – 10/2002 1,310 45 2.42% 3.44% 0.916 0.926 0.676 0.418 1.095 0.4108 0.5179 0.5785
10/2002 – 10/2003 1,360 29 2.37% 2.13% 0.916 0.948 0.010 2.490 2.500 0.9219 0.1146 0.2865
10/2003 – 10/2004 1,551 14 0.40% 0.90% 0.941 0.952 2.688 0.111 2.798 0.1011 0.7395 0.2468
10/2004 – 10/2005 1,653 15 0.50% 0.91% 0.953 0.958 1.590 0.024 1.614 0.2074 0.8765 0.4462
10/2005 – 10/2006 1,666 6 0.36% 0.36% 0.957 0.990 0.081 0.484 0.566 0.7757 0.4864 0.7537
10/2006 – 10/2007 1,724 6 0.34% 0.35% 0.952 0.992 0.086 0.606 0.692 0.7694 0.4362 0.7075
10/2007 – 10/2008 1,642 15 0.49% 0.91% 0.957 0.925 1.712 1.226 2.938 0.1907 0.2682 0.2302
10/2008 – 10/2009 1,619 52 3.59% 3.21% 0.876 0.896 0.008 1.105 1.113 0.9283 0.2931 0.5731
10/2009 – 10/2010 1,518 19 0.77% 1.25% 0.886 0.946 1.106 2.820 3.926 0.2930 0.0931 0.1404
10/2010 – 10/2011 1,471 8 0.31% 0.54% 0.927 0.982 1.393 1.281 2.674 0.2379 0.2577 0.2626
10/2000 – 10/2011 16,727 254 1.20% 1.52% 0.941 0.945 1.669 0.506 2.175 0.1964 0.4769 0.3371
multi-period test 16,727 254 1.20% 1.52% 0.941 0.945 10.45 10.64 21.10 0.4900 0.4738 0.5148
Panel B: S&P PD
10/2000 – 10/2001 1,213 45 1.65% 3.71% 0.913 0.912 2.731 0.007 2.738 0.0984 0.9330 0.2544
10/2001 – 10/2002 1,310 45 1.61% 3.44% 0.918 0.865 2.411 13.116 15.527 0.1205 0.0003 0.0004
10/2002 – 10/2003 1,360 29 1.71% 2.13% 0.924 0.939 0.378 0.681 1.059 0.5389 0.4092 0.5890
10/2003 – 10/2004 1,551 14 1.53% 0.90% 0.919 0.904 0.282 0.296 0.577 0.5957 0.5865 0.7492
10/2004 – 10/2005 1,653 15 1.33% 0.91% 0.912 0.923 0.101 0.148 0.250 0.7506 0.7000 0.8827
10/2005 – 10/2006 1,666 6 1.32% 0.36% 0.913 0.897 3.536 0.120 3.656 0.0601 0.7291 0.1608
10/2006 – 10/2007 1,724 6 1.44% 0.35% 0.910 0.984 4.945 2.734 7.679 0.0262 0.0982 0.0215
10/2007 – 10/2008 1,642 15 1.57% 0.91% 0.904 0.915 0.299 0.167 0.466 0.5844 0.6828 0.7921
10/2008 – 10/2009 1,619 52 1.58% 3.21% 0.906 0.931 2.129 2.844 4.973 0.1445 0.0917 0.0832
10/2009 – 10/2010 1,518 19 2.02% 1.25% 0.908 0.973 0.206 7.396 7.602 0.6499 0.0065 0.0223
10/2010 – 10/2011 1,471 8 1.64% 0.54% 0.901 0.967 2.123 3.061 5.184 0.1451 0.0802 0.0749
10/2000 – 10/2011 16,727 254 1.57% 1.52% 0.912 0.918 0.008 0.919 0.928 0.9269 0.3377 0.6289
multi-period test 16,727 254 1.57% 1.52% 0.912 0.918 19.14 30.57 49.71 0.0586 0.0013 0.0006
The validation sample contains 16,727 observations and 254 defaults from 11/2000 to 10/2011. The level statistic compares the realized default
rate (real. PD) with the expected rate (exp. PD). The shape statistic depends on the difference between the realized (real. area) and the expected
area (exp. area) above the Lorenz curve. The combined statistic is a summary statistic on level and shape. The three last columns report the
p-values of the three statistics of each year and the corresponding statistics over all ten years. The last line reports the multi-period test statistic,
the sum of the yearly statistics. The null hypothesis of a level and shape calibrated rating methodology is clearly rejected for S&P ratings with a
p-value of 0.06%, but clearly not for our default probabilities obtained with MZ1.
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